Introduction
The transfer of knowledge is an important part of many economic and everyday situations. Examples can be easily found in the corporate sector (when new employees need to receive rm-specic information from their colleagues), in private life (when parents give advice to their children career choice, for example), and most prominently in the education sector (which is in essence mainly occupied with the transfer of knowledge). While standard economic theory maintains that people need incentives to exert eort, little is known about the interplay of incentives and eort in knowledge transmission processes. In particular the role of monetary incentives in this context is far from clear even though there can be little doubt that nancial considerations play a big role at least in professional environments. The paper presented here aims to shed some light on this aspect by analyzing the role of monetary incentives in knowledge transfer, using a laboratory experiment.
Although in general both agents in a knowledge transmission process -the provider and the receiver of knowledge -can be subject to incentive problems, it is particularly important to incentivize knowledge providers as they usually do not have an inherent incentive to spend eort on the task. New employees for example may be motivated to learn with a view to increasing their future opportunities. Their advisors on the other hand may shirk, for instance because they concentrate their eort on incentivized tasks to increase their monetary payo. In such a scenario the knowledge provider should receive a reward for her eorts that should ideally be dependent on the amount of knowledge the intended recipient actually receives. This incentive-compatible approach is however rarely used. School teachers for example often receive with a xed wage, regardless of their students' performance 1 . Similarly, companies seldom include knowledge transfer in the criteria used for variable compensation.
In many industries, monetary incentive schemes are however a standard way to motivate employees in areas apart from knowledge transfer. Adams et al. (2009) estimate that in 2002, 33% of the Fortune 1000 companies used some kind of individual incentive. The economic argument for variable pay linked to performance is to align the interests of employers and employees (Kessler and Purcell, 1992) . Existing research has shown that monetary incentives indeed aect agents' eort in many settings. Several studies have found a positive eect of performance pay on worker eort and productivity. This eect is however task dependent and Camerer and Hogarth (1999) conclude in a survey of experimental results that "The data show that incentives sometimes improve performance, but often don't" (pg. 32). In another survey Prendergast (1999) looks at the provision of monetary incentives in rms and concludes that "incentives matter" (pg. 11).
There is, however, also evidence that the introduction of monetary incentives might have adverse 1 This is e.g. true for most teachers Germany, who do not receive any variable wage at all. eects: Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show that an extrinsic source of motivation like money might crowd out intrinsic motivation to do the task well and therefore diminish eort. As a consequence low monetary incentives reduce performance in comparison to a scenario without monetary incentives. In contrast, Pokorny (2008) nds that even low piece rate payments improve performance in a real eort experiment. Despite these diverging key results both studies provide evidence for non-monotonic eects of monetary incentives. They thus exemplify that nding the optimal incentive scheme is not a trivial exercise. This is even more so if, apart from possible crowding out eects, performance is hard to measure, as it is the case with knowledge transfer or learning success. Adams et al. (2009) give several examples where this problem leads to a worse outcome compared to a situation without conditional monetary incentives and Prendergast emphasizes that "there has been insucient focus on workers whose outputs are hard to observe" (pg. 11).
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the rst to analyze the actual teaching process in the laboratory. There is, however, a literature on information transmission by way of advice giving (e.g. Chaudhuri et al., 2006; Schotter and Sopher, 2007) . This literature has shown that participants in experiments strongly respond to advice, even in an anonymous experimental setup. These studies dier however from the paper at hand in at least two signicant ways. First, advice deals with situations such as public good or ultimatum games. Thus, individual preferences and interaction play a role and there is no such thing as correct advice. Second, the focus is the advice giving environment and incentive schemes are not alternated as treatment variables.
While there is no laboratory evidence on monetary incentives in knowledge transmission processes, recent studies from the eld of education economics have provided eld evidence on teacher performance pay. The most compelling evidence stems from eld experiments in India (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 2011) and Israel (Lavy, 2002 (Lavy, , 2009 . The data from these experiments reveal a signicantly positive eect of merit pay systems. Figlio and Kenny (2007) as well as Woessmann (2011) draw a similar conclusion from analyzing survey data from the United States and cross-country data, respectively. Despite those positive results there is also evidence that sheds some doubt on teacher performance pay. Reback penalizes schools which do not meet minimum prociency requirements. The author nds that teachers as a consequence focus on those students close to this minimum prociency threshold which results in an improvement only for relatively low performing students. Simlarly, Glewwe et al. (2010) nd that teachers focus on incentivized goals and disregard non-incentivized ones.
The brief literature overview shows that a nal understanding of the eects of monetary incentives requires further research. The present paper aims to provide one further step in this direction by analyzing instructors' incentives in a knowledge transmission laboratory experiment. It contributes to the literature in various ways. First, the controlled laboratory environment reduces problems of measuring eort by providing observable outcomes. Second, the experimental setup allows a direct comparison of four dierent incentive schemes at reasonable costs. Third, prospective teachers can be compared to other participants 2 to draw preliminary conclusions on whether they respond dierently to monetary incentives in this specic task.
2 Experimental design 2.1 Structure All subjects in the experiment are assigned to one of two roles, instructor or pupil, which they keep throughout the whole experiment. The experiment consists of three parts. All subjects are placed in sound protected cabins with closed doors during the experiment. Subjects are allowed to make notes but are asked to use the notepad provided by the experimenters. The instructions include information about all three parts of the experiment 3 .
In the rst part, only subjects in the instructor role (from now on instructors) participate. After reading the instructions, they see a presentation on two topics. The instructors can freely move through the slides of this presentation, but only have 20 minutes time to do so. The two topics used in the presentation are a self-developed card game called Pizzabäcker 4 and the articial language Lojban 5 .
These two topics have been chosen because they fulll several requirements: No subject should have prior knowledge of them, the topics should yield enough questions to allow variance, they should be easy to translate into multiple choice questions, and suciently complex to explain and teach. Two topics rather than only one were chosen to decrease the inuence of idiosyncratic capabilities of the participants (if, e.g., one subject is very talented at understanding languages, the addition of a second unrelated topic decreases the distorting inuence of this). Both topics take up the same number of slides in the presentation, which is known by the participants beforehand. In addition to the presentation itself, instructors also receive additional material to help them understand the topics better: a complete set of cards for the card game and a sheet containing the alphabet and one sentence for the language. During the presentation for the instructors, the subjects in the pupil role (from now on pupils) also enter the laboratory. Every pupil is randomly assigned to one instructor. The pupils are given the same instructions as the instructors 2 See Section 2.2 for a detailed explanation. 3 A set of complete instructions can be found in the Appendix. 4 The card game's name translates to Pizza baker and was adapted from the game Dia de los muertos. The original game was created by Frank Graham, who graciously allowed us to use it. 5 See http://www.lojban.org for a short introduction.
(including the material belonging to the card game and the language). While the pupils read those instructions, the instructors nish the presentation and then have 10 minutes time to prepare for the second part of the experiment.
In the second part, the actual teaching takes place. For each instructor-pupil pair a one-way video conference is established, such that the pupil can see and hear the instructor but not vice versa. This one-sided mode of communication was chosen to rule out the possible inuence of the pupil on the quality of the teaching. If a pupil is very smart or motivated, she can positively inuence the teaching quality and eort by, e.g., asking good questions. As the aim of the design is to isolate the eects the treatments have on the instructors, this is not desirable. The connection between pupil and instructor lasts for 10 minutes, and the resulting video is recorded with the knowledge (and prior consent) of the subjects.
Before the 10 minutes start, instructors are given some extra time to calibrate the position of the camera, their headset and the volume. During the 10 minutes, pupils can only press a button which indicates to the instructor that they can see and hear her properly. Instructors are not given any encouragement on how to spend the 10 minutes, they can e.g. easily avoid teaching altogether and concentrate on their notes instead (some instructors do in fact point the camera away from them so their pupil cannot see them).
In the third and nal part, instructors and pupils all have to answer the same 30 multiple choice questions (15 for each topic), where four possible answers are given for each question and exactly one answer is correct. Each question is displayed for 40 seconds on the screen, the subjects cannot speed up the questions or return to older questions. This procedure is described in the instructions for everybody.
After the questions are answered, every subject is informed how many questions and which questions he has answered correctly. In the treatments where instructors' payo depends on the pupils' answers, the instructors are additionally informed about the number of correct answers of their assigned pupil.
After the experiment itself, subjects ll out a questionnaire with questions about demographics (sex, age, study length, study subject), their school grades (last math grade and last German grade), some personality measures, teaching experience, general card game experience, risk attitude, and if they knew Lojban or the card game before the experiment.
Treatments
Pupils always receive the same payo: For each correctly answered question, they receive EUR 0.75.
Instructors also receive EUR 0.75 for each question they answer correctly, but may get an additional payo depending on the treatment they are in. In the treatment Fix, instructors receive an additional payo of EUR 4.50 no matter how good their pupil is. In the treatment Linear, instructors receive an additional EUR 0.30 for each question their pupil answers correctly. In the treatment Bonus, they receive an additional EUR 9.00 if their pupil has at least 15 correct answers. For the treatment Tournament, the instructor-pupil pairs are each randomly assigned to groups of three pairs. The instructors then receive an additional EUR 13.50 if their pupil is the best one in their group. No show-up fee was paid in any of the treatments.
The amount of money given in the individual treatments was calibrated in such a way that the ex post payo average for the instructors remains roughly constant in all treatments 6 . Otherwise, a dierence in teaching between the treatments might be due to the higher amount of money earned and not the conditionality of the payo.
In addition to the payo scheme, a second treatment dimension is the subject pool used in the instructor role. To approximate actual teachers, students of educational science who want to become teachers are used 7 . In the following, the abbreviation EDU is used for those students, while Non-EDU designates other students.
Combining these two treatment dimensions results in 8 treatments. Table 1 shows the number of observations for each treatment. 
Procedures
The experiment was conducted computer-based and took place at the Essen laboratory for experimental economics (elfe) at the University of Duisburg-Essen in May and November 2011. Participants were recruited via the program ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and the attached subject pool 8 . To program the experiment, the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) was used. For the video conference, a customized version of the software Vivicom was used. In total, 34 sessions with up to 12 subjects each were conducted, leading to a total of 392 participants 9 . The participants were all students from the University of DuisburgEssen. To avoid a confounding of possible treatment eects with gender eects, all treatments included a balanced ratio of all possible gender pairings (male instructor/male pupil, female instructor/male pupil, 6 This was done by rst running the Linear treatment and then choosing the gures according to the results. 7 The German system of teacher education is set up in a way that studying a subject to become a teacher is a distinct degree and university career from studying the subject per se (These students are called Lehramtsstudenten). For example becoming a chemistry teacher means studying chemistry to become a teacher, and not the regular subject chemistry. This makes it possible to claim that a large share of the subjects used in the experiment will indeed become teachers.
8 Table A in the appendix shows some descripitive statistics of the participants 9 Of those, 4 subject pairs experienced technical problems and therefore are excluded from the analysis.
male instructor/female pupil, and female instructor/female pupil) 10 . The experiment lasted about 90 minutes for the instructors and 60 minutes for the pupils. Average payo was EUR 20.23 (minimum EUR 9.75, maximum EUR 30.75) for the instructors and EUR 12.13 for the pupils (minimum EUR 4.50, maximum EUR 18.75). Subjects were paid out one after the other to preserve anonymity; the instructors were paid out before the pupils.
Hypotheses
Instructors in the present experiment can invest the restricted time during a session in learning and teaching. Even if both eorts are not completely separable it seems plausible to assume that instructors face a trade-o between teaching and learning due to both the restricted time available and the complexity of the content. From a theoretical point of view it is thus evident that homo oeconomicus like instructors do not exert teaching eort in the treatment Fix. In contrast, any of the implemented incentive schemes shifts priorities towards teaching under very weak assumptions 11 . If we dene the share of knowledge an instructor is able to transfer to her pupil as "number of correct pupil answers" divided by "number of correct instructor answers" for each pupil-instructor pair, we can thus formulate hypothesis 1 as follows:
The lowest share of knowledge transmitted occurs in the treatment Fix.
This hypothesis is tentatively supported by previous research. Even though it is dicult to compare both the task as well as the incentive schemes in this paper to the previous literature, there is some evidence that monetary incentives can increase performance (e.g. Bull et al., 1987; van Dijk et al., 2001; Lazear, 2000; Shearer, 2004) 12 . These papers furthermore seem to point at better performance under tournament than under piece rate incentives. From a theoretical point of view, however, this result depends on preferences and expectations of agents and on the specic setup of the tournament 13 .
As for the two dierent subject pools, a priori the rationale still holds: If teaching causes disutility, a monetary incentive for it will increase eort. While it can be argued that teachers are maybe intrinsically motivated and therefore should not react to monetary incentives, the before mentioned literature on teacher performance pay indicates that they do. This leads to hypothesis 2:
There is no dierence in the incentive reaction between the subject pools EDU and Non-EDU. 10 Due to the aforementioned exclusions, the balancing was not perfect. 11 Of course, one can think of preferences or expectations that e.g. let instructors shy away from competition. These would need to be very strong, however, to prevent every kind of priority shifting through the incentive schemes.
12 Note, that a lot of experimental studies discuss pay for performance that is added on top of a xed wage. See Camerer and Hogarth for an overview. In contrast, participants in the treatment Fix of the current paper receive a higher xed payo than participants in other treatments. Against the background of the literature on eciency wage theory and gift-exchange games (c.f. Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Fehr et al., 1998) this aspect hinders a direct comparison.
13 See for example Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003) for an experimental investigation of the latter aspect. Figure 1 shows the average share of knowledge transmission for all eight treatments. Looking rst at the Non-EDU subjects, the highest average ratio is 0.92 in the Bonus treatment, followed by the Linear (0.89), the Tournament (0.88), and the Fix (0.75) treatment. Testing these dierences pairwise reveals a signicant dierence between the Fix treatment and all other treatments (p<0.05 for all pairwise tests 14 ).
Results

Treatment eects
The treatments with a conditional monetary incentive (Linear, Fix, and Tournament) are not signicantly dierent from each other in terms of the ratio (all tests yield p>0.1). Therefore, the formulated hypothesis cannot be rejected for the Non-EDU subjects. Now looking at the EDU subjects, the ordering of treatments remains the same, but the dierence between the Fix treatment and the other treatments is less pronounced: The highest ratio was achieved under the Bonus payment system (0.84), followed by the Linear (0.83), the Tournament (0.82), and the Fix (0.79) payment scheme. These dierences are not signicant (all tests yield p>0.1). Therefore, the hypothesis can be rejected for the subjects who study to become teachers: The payment scheme has no inuence on their teaching performance 15 .
Comparing the two dierent subject pools with each other for each treatment separately reveals that There are no systematic (or signicant) dierences for the EDU subjects.
there are no signicant dierences between prospective teachers (the EDU subjects) and students who do not want to become teachers (the Non-EDU subjects) 16 . Still, as shown previously, the reactions of the teachers on the dierent payment schemes are dierent for both groups. 
Video analysis
To open up the black box of the teaching process, the instructor videos are looked at directly and coded along several dimensions.
20 The analysis here is focused on the ob jectively codable variables: The time actually used to teach is recorded, starting with the rst remark with content (thus excluding Can you hear me? or similar). Additionally, the time(s) when the topic is switched and the rst topic are recorded, such that one can determine how much time was used for each topic. Furthermore, the type of pronoun used by the instructor (i.e. if the instructor refers to herself as I consistently or if she includes the pupil by using we at least once) and the type of address (i.e. if the instructor directly addresses the pupil at least once or if he uses an indirect address) are coded. Finally, it is recorded if the instructor points out to the pupil that she has the some material at her disposal. 18 All pairwise comparisons p>0.1. 19 Note that the number of pupils' correct answers can be seen as a function of instructors' teaching eort and pupils' eort while the number of instructors' correct answers is only a function of their studying eort. Consequently, an eort shift because of changed incentives has stronger eects on the instructors' answers than on the pupils' answers if pupils' eort is assumed to remain constant.
20 Table B in the appendix gives an overview of all coded variables. The more subjective variables are not used in the analysis. The coding of these variables proved to be too unreliable even though all coding was done by two dierent coders. This is especially true for the variables which measure how good each question is answerable with only the information given by the instructor. Of the 30 questions coded this way, in about one third the two coders had discrepancies more than 40% of the time. 21 Comparing these variables along the dierent incentive schemes, however, does not reveal any systematic dierences. 22 Note that the type of address does not inuence the results in terms of transferred knowledge. Figure 4 shows the average time instructors use to teach the dierent topics. Instructors spent more time for the topic Pizzabäcker -which was also the one they saw rst in the presentation -than for the topic Lojban. However, there are no signicant dierences between treatments, regardless of the subject pool. The observed dierences in outcome for the Non-EDU teachers are therefore not caused by simple quantity of teaching, but must have their causes in the manner of teaching. 
Regression
A dierent way to look at the data is by using a regression. Table 3 shows the results of a simple OLS regression with the share of transferred knowledge as the dependent variable. The regression is performed for the whole sample, just with the EDU students and just with the Non-EDU students. The results partly conrm those from the non-parametric tests above: The treatment dummies for the Linear and Bonus treatment have a signicantly positive eect (with the Fix treatment as a baseline) on the share of transferred knowledge only for the Non-EDU students. In terms of economic signicance, the treatment eect for the Non-EDU students varies between 0.141 (Bonus) and 0.160 (Linear), so that the introduction of a monetary incentive increases the share of transferred knowledge by at least 14.1 percentage points. Comparing this to the average share of 75% in the Fix treatment for Non-EDU Notes: Fixed treatment is the baseline for the treatment dummies. P-values in parentheses. Signicance levels: *10% **5% ***1%. Source: Own calculations.
subjects shows that this is indeed a sizable increase.
In addition, other potentially confounding variables like age, sex, or school grades have no inuence in the full sample. Finally, the only signicant variable which deals with the way of teaching is the dummy if instructors have told their pupils that they have the same material at their place. This is somewhat surprising, as a priori the use of the material by the pupils should make it easier for them to understand the topics. However, a possible explanation for the decrease in transferred information might be that the instructor then omits some facts, thinking that the pupil can get them from the material.
Conclusion and discussion
Financial incentives conditional on the employee's performance are used in many, if not most, professional settings. In the realm of knowledge transfer, however, and especially in the education industry, they are not as widespread. This paper analyzes how dierent monetary incentives inuence the eort and performance of people who are trying to transfer valuable knowledge: Students who want to become teachers are not inuenced by dierent incentive schemes, while other students react in the expected way to monetary incentives: Linear, Bonus, and Tournament pay schemes all improve the ratio of transferred knowledge compared to a xed wage. Between these three dierent schemes, there is however no dierence. Looking at the time the subjects use to teach instead of the outcome, there is no dierence between the dierent incentive schemes, regardless of the subject pool.
There are two possible explanations for the dierent results obtained with the two subject pools:
People with certain preferences (such as high risk aversion or other-regarding preferences) might selfselect into certain elds of study 23 . Dohmen and Falk (2010) show that this is the case for risk attitudes as more risk averse people select themselves into the teaching profession, thereby inuencing the eect of certain incentive schemes. However, this can account for only a small part of the results in the paper at hand, as the Linear incentive scheme should be inuenced by risk attitude less than the Tournament or the Bonus incentive schemes 24 . In addition, this paper's sample does not exhibit signicant dierences in risk or trust attitude as measured by a standard survey question in the questionnaire 25 . Furthermore, in most treatments neither trust nor risk attitude are signicantly correlated with the ratio of transferred knowledge when tested for each treatment separately 26 .
23 Several studies nd for example that students of economic subjects behave dierently than students of other elds (Brosig-Koch et al. (2011); Ockenfels and Weimann (1999); Rubinstein (2006) ). Brosig et al. (2010) nd indication that these dierences can be explained by selection rather than education eects 24 In fact, the only inuence of risk attitudes in the Linear scheme comes from the uncertainty how the student will perform given a certain teaching level, not from the incentive scheme itself.
25 Dohmen et al. (2011) show that these survey questions are highly correlated with experimentally validated risk attitudes; Fehr et al. (2002) do the same for the trust question.
26 This is done with Spearman correlation coecients. The only signicant correlations are between risk attitude and ratio of transferred knowledge in the Fix treatment with Non-EDU subjects (p<0.05) and in the Linear treatment with Non-EDU subjects (p<0.1).
A second and complementary explanation is that (prospective) teachers have a preference for the act of teaching itself. This could mean that such an intrinsic motivation would diminish the eect of an additional extrinsic source of motivation like money 27 . Such a crowding out eect would lead to no eect on teaching quality, matching the observed results. A more likely explanation could be that due to their intrinsic motivation, prospective teachers already give their maximum possible teaching eort, regardless of monetary incentives. This would mean that while introducing an additional monetary incentive might lead to the teachers wanting to increase their eort, this is just not possible. However, this would also mean that in the sample at hand prospective teachers have a lower ceiling in terms of teaching quality than the other students, as they are not able to transfer as much knowledge in the treatments with momentary incentives. An interesting follow-up study would be to look at the long term eect of monetary incentives on knowledge transfer, as the intrinsic motivation for teaching might change over time. This might help to entangle the two possible underlying causes described above. Welcome to the experiment! You are participating at a study of decision making behavior in the context of experimental economics. During the study you and the other participants will be asked to make decisions. You can earn money with this study. How much money you earn is dependent on the course of the experiment. You will receive detailed instructions about this in the following. All participants are paid in cash directly after the experiment one by one. To assure this, please remain seated after the experiment until your cabin number is called.
Appendix Tables and gures
During the course of the experiment, no participant will receive information about the other participants' identity. All decisions are therefore made anonymously.
Should you have any questions before the start of the experiment, please ask an employee of the laboratory. He will come to your place and help you. Any communication with the other participants during the experiment is only allowed when explicitly prompted; breaking this rule will lead to an immediate exclusion from the experiment.
Instructions
The experiment consists of three parts. In the following, you will receive detailed information about these. Please read the instructions carefully and thoroughly and click the start button on the screen only after you have claried all possible questions. After that, further questions cannot be answered any more. In this experiment, you are either a teacher or a student. All participants receive the same instructions and materials, however. At the beginning of the experiment, your role is displayed on the screen. You are allowed to make notes during the whole experiment. You are informed about the remaining time of the single parts on the computer screen.
Part 1
In the rst part of the experiment, teachers see a presentation which contains 28 slides for a total of 20 minutes. In this presentation, two topics -on 14 slides each -are explained. Teachers can control the presentation with the buttons at the bottom of the screen. Some additional materials belonging to the two topics are included with the instructions. Students receive the same additional materials. After the 20 minutes are over, teachers have 10 minutes to prepare for part 2 of the experiment. In total, part 1 therefore lasts 30 minutes.
Students enter the laboratory during the course of the rst part. They do not participate at part 1.
Part 2
Every teacher is randomly assigned one student. The computer automatically establishes a audio-and video-connection between a teacher and his student. Every teacher now has the chance to pass along the knowledge acquired in part 1 to his student. Picture and sound are transmitted only from the teacher. Each student can only conrm by clicking a button that he can see and hear the teacher at the beginning of the transmission. Before the transmission starts, teachers have one minute to adjust camera position and sound volume:
Camera position: Teachers can manually adjust the camera on the monitor in a way that they can see themselves in the middle of the right screen.
Sound volume: At the top of the video picture, teachers can as observe the volume level of their voice (dark blue area) when they speak into the microphone as seen on the following picture:
To adjust the volume level, a menu appears at the top of the screen when the mouse is moved there:
The indicator for the microphone (right) should be in a position that the volume level is clearly reacting when speaking normally.
Additionally, students can adjust the volume directly at the headset's cord.
In general, the content of the communication can be chosen freely by the teachers. They are however not permitted to give personal information about themselves. This includes for example name, age, address, study subject, or similar. Breaking this rule will lead to exclusion from the experiment and therefore no payo.
After 10 minutes, the transmission stops automatically and part 3 starts. 2. Three randomly chosen teachers form a group. The teacher in this group whose student answered the most questions correctly receives EUR 13.5. In the case of a tie, the EUR 13.50 are divided equally among the respective teachers. [only in treatment Tournament] Students receive EUR 0.75 for every question they have answered correctly themselves.
